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The role of actively open-minded thinking in information
acquisition, accuracy, and calibration
Uriel Haran∗ Ilana Ritov† Barbara A. Mellers‡
Abstract
Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant informa-
tion. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in
an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to
maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain
quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only
AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency
to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is
predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts.
Keywords: forecasting, prediction, overconfidence, calibration, individual differences, actively open-minded thinking.
1 Introduction
Research in disciplines such as meteorology, statistics,
finance, and psychology has tried to measure and ex-
plain the relationship between people’s confidence in
their predictions and the accuracy of those predictions
(e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Har-
vey, 1997; Henrion & Fischhoff, 1986; Klayman, Soll,
González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999). Overconfidence in
the accuracy of one’s estimates—sometimes called over-
precision, to distinguish it from other types of overcon-
fidence (Moore & Healy, 2008)—refers to the discrep-
ancy between the confidence people have in the accu-
racy of their estimates, predictions, or beliefs and actual
accuracy rate. Overconfidence has proven to be robust
and difficult to remedy, although some interventions have
been partially successful (Haran, Moore, & Morewedge,
2010; Soll & Klayman, 2004; Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010).
In this work, we examine cognitive styles and personal-
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ity dimensions that might be related to performance, and
seek an explanation for how they work.
1.1 Prediction error and insufficient search
for information
Most studies attribute confidence-accuracy miscalibra-
tion to one of two shortcomings. The first is the under-
appreciation of uncertainty and sources of error (e.g.,
Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 1991;
Soll, 1996). Specifically, Juslin, Winman, and Hansson
(2007) argued that judges make two errors in transform-
ing samples of information into an estimate: they per-
ceive the sample as an exact, unbiased representation of
the estimated population; and they fail to acknowledge
that sample variances are smaller than population vari-
ances. As a consequence, their estimates often miss the
mark.
The second shortcoming is the tendency to focus on the
first answer that comes to mind, while failing to properly
consider alternative outcomes (e.g., McKenzie, 1998).
This failure to consider alternatives may come in the form
of an incomplete search for relevant information, failure
to retrieve available information from memory, or under-
weighting the importance or validity of information in-
consistent with one’s initial hypothesis. The estimation
process begins with a search in memory for relevant in-
formation to provide a tentative answer. This tentative an-
swer, once reached, biases the search and retrieval of new
information, as well as the interpretation of ambiguous
evidence, in favor of the initial conclusion (e.g., Hoch,
1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980).
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Building on this conceptualization, researchers have
tried to improve confidence-accuracy calibration by en-
couraging judges to direct more attention to alterna-
tive evidence and other possible answers. Fischhoff
and Bar Hillel (1984) instructed participants to look at
the problems they were solving from different perspec-
tives. Others (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Morgan & Keith,
2008) asked forecasters to project multiple scenarios,
rather than imagine the one they deemed most proba-
ble. McKenzie (1997) explicitly told participants to take
the alternative into account before making an estimate,
whereas Koriat et al. (1980) instructed judges to gener-
ate self-contradicting arguments. These studies have re-
ported modest success in reducing the discrepancy be-
tween the confidence judges displayed in their estimates
and their accuracy, not by increasing accuracy, but by re-
ducing confidence.
1.2 Is considering more information bet-
ter?
Infinite search for, and consideration of information prior
to an estimate will result in the most informed estimate
possible. These procedures, however, are costly in time
and effort, and their utility—the likelihood that the esti-
mate based on them will be accurate—increases at a di-
minishing rate (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). According to
some (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren,
2006; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), effortful search
and information processing may even decrease accuracy.
Judges, then, should be cognizant of an optimal point at
which they should stop their efforts, in order to increase
accuracy on the one hand, and avoid waste of resources
on the other (Baron, Badgio, & Ritov, 1991; Browne &
Pitts, 2004; Juslin & Olsson, 1997). While we agree that
too much processing can hinder efficient decision mak-
ing, people rarely “overthink” before making an estimate
or forecast, and they have never been criticized for draw-
ing conclusions from too large a sample. While pro-
posed strategies for effective judgment vary greatly and
not all prescribe more search and deliberation, we seek to
identify the characteristics of persistent judges who ac-
quire more information before estimating. We acknowl-
edge that these individuals might not always make su-
perior forecasts than those who collect less information.
Therefore, our studies measure not only information ac-
quisition but also accuracy of estimations based on the
acquired information.
1.3 Is estimate quality an individual at-
tribute?
Previous research has documented stable individual dif-
ferences in calibration (e.g., Klayman et al., 1999; Wolfe
& Grosch, 1990). For example, some evidence indicates
that men are more overconfident in their estimates than
are women (Barber & Odean, 2001). Calibration is also
related to expertise (Koehler, Brenner, & Griffin, 2002),
though not in every estimate format (McKenzie, Lier-
sch, & Yaniv, 2008). Surprisingly, not many relation-
ships have been found between accurate estimations and
personality attributes. Extraversion correlates negatively
with accuracy and calibration on various cognitive and es-
timation tasks (Lynn, 1961; Schaefer, Williams, Goodie,
& Campbell, 2004; Taylor & McFatter, 2003), but posi-
tively with short-term recall (Howarth & Eysenck, 1968;
Osborne, 1972). McElroy and Dowd (2007) found that
openness to experience was related to greater suscep-
tibility to the anchoring bias. Finally, overconfidence
has been linked to proactiveness (Pallier et al., 2002),
narcissism (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004), self-
monitoring (Cutler & Wolfe, 1989), and trait optimism
(Buehler & Griffin, 2003).
Researchers have established a stronger link between
cognitive style and estimation performance. For example,
McElroy and Seta (2003) found that an analytic and sys-
tematic processing style correlated with reduced suscep-
tibility to framing effects. Baron, Badgio, and Gaskins
(1986) assessed reflection/impulsivity in students, a di-
mension that corresponds to the speed vs. accuracy trade-
off in problem-solving. Those who are more reflective
take more time to reason before acting and deciding, a
tendency found to be related to better performance (i.e.,
a lower error rate, Kagan, 1965; Messer, 1970; Weiss
Barstis & Ford, 1977). In this paper, we examine four
dimensions of cognitive styles and their influence on the
accuracy of estimations.
Actively open-minded thinking. Going beyond the
reflection/impulsivity construct, Baron (1993) developed
a reasoning style called actively open-minded thinking
(AOT). This style of thinking includes the tendency to
weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend
sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to con-
sider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s
own. Research by Stanovich, West, and others (Macpher-
son & Stanovich, 2007; Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999;
Stanovich & West, 1998) found that AOT was related
to a reduced susceptibility to belief bias—the inability
to decouple prior knowledge from reasoning processes.
This relative immunity to over-reliance on prior beliefs
might increase actively open-minded thinkers’ desire to
be more informed before making an estimate or predic-
tion, and their higher attention to information already ac-
quired may further improve their estimation performance.
Items of the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale are
provided in the Appendix.1
1The scale was based on a much longer scale described by Stanovich
and West (2007; some of the items are listed by Sa et al., 1999), in stud-
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Need for cognition. This cognitive style refers to the
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive en-
deavors (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Cohen (1957)
argued that individuals with a high need for cognition
were more likely to organize, elaborate on, and evalu-
ate information. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found that
this attribute predicted attitudes toward simple cognitive
tasks, relative to complex ones. Individuals with low
need for cognition enjoyed easier tasks, whereas those
with high need for cognition enjoyed more difficult tasks.
Kardash and Scholes (1996) found a relationship between
need for cognition and the tendency to properly draw in-
conclusive inferences from mixed evidence. People with
high need for cognition were less likely to jump to a con-
clusion when the evidence did not warrant it. Finally,
Blais, Thompson, and Baranski (2005) found a positive
relationship between need for cognition and accuracy in
judgment.
Grit. Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and Kelly
(2007) developed the construct of grit as a complement
to intelligence in predicting success in academic con-
texts. They defined grit as perseverance and passion for
long-term goals. This trait includes the exertion of vig-
orous effort to overcome challenges and maintain effort
in the face of failure and adversity. The authors found
that, while grit did not correlate positively with IQ, it ac-
counted for some of the variance in successful outcomes
of academics and professionals.
Maximizing vs. satisficing. Maximizing behavior is
aimed at achieving the highest expected utility (Simon,
1978). In choice, those who maximize look for the
best option, as opposed to those who satisfice, or choose
an alternative that is “good enough”. Satisficing is of-
ten linked to the use of heuristics in judgment and de-
cision processes and is assumed to be more prone to
bias. Surprisingly, several studies have found the oppo-
site pattern—that maximizers report more frequent en-
gagement in spontaneous decision making (Parker, Bru-
ine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007) and display both lower
accuracy and greater overconfidence than do satisficers
in prediction tasks (Jain, Bearden, & Filipowicz, 2013).
These studies have tended to focus on judgment outcomes
and not on the process by which judgments are formed.
Therefore, we included this measure to test whether max-
imizers look for more information than satisficers before
deciding that they are sufficiently informed to make an
estimate.
These four attributes—AOT, need for cognition, grit,
and maximizing—are conceptually distinct. Actively
open-minded thinking refers to the consideration of ev-
ies of college students. The short form used here selected (and edited)
items that Baron deemed most relevant to a general population, not
just students, and that were most directly related to Baron’s conceptual
framework. They were then tested for reliability and refined further.
idence prior to making a decision. Thus, we expected it
to be the most predictive of information acquisition in our
studies. Need for cognition is a general trait that reflects
the desire to think and exert mental effort. Grit and maxi-
mizing are even broader constructs, in the sense that they
are not limited to thinking tasks. Despite these conceptual
differences, all four variables may predict the willingness
to spend more time and effort in making an informed pre-
diction.
We conducted three studies to examine the relation-
ships between these attributes, persistence in informa-
tion acquisition, and performance in an estimation task.
We measured individual attributes and elicited estimates
in both categorical and quantitative formats. We either
measured or manipulated the amount of information par-
ticipants obtained prior to estimation. All three stud-
ies were conducted online. Participants were recruited
through Amazon.com Mechanical Turk (see Krantz &
Dalal, 2000; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010 for re-
views of this participant pool and online data collection
in general).
2 Study 1
Participants made a series of categorical and quantita-
tive estimates. We measured the four individual differ-
ence variables mentioned earlier, as well as the amount
of information participants acquired prior to each esti-
mate. The goal was to examine whether the propensity
to acquire more information, as well as subsequent per-
formance, could be predicted by any or all of the four
thinking-style attributes.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and procedure
One-hundred eighty three U.S. based participants (97 fe-
males, Mean age = 35.28) completed an online survey
in exchange for $0.50 each. The study consisted of two
parts. The first part included four perception tasks, pre-
sented in an order chosen at random for each participant.
In each task, participants saw a number of objects of dif-
ferent types (i.e., 47 balls of four different colors, 25
emoticons of three different expressions, 42 mathemat-
ical characters of four types, 30 objects of four different
shapes; see Figure 1 for an example). The objects were
presented at random places on a computer screen for four
seconds at a time. Participants then estimated which ob-
ject type appeared most frequently, rated their confidence
in the accuracy of this estimate, and provided an 80%
confidence interval for the total number of objects on the
screen.
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Figure 1: A sample stimulus used in Studies 1 and 2. Par-
ticipants estimated which type of character was the most
frequent on the screen, as well as the total number of char-
acters presented.
Persistence in information acquisition. Participants
were permitted to view the objects as many times as they
wanted. Each time, the objects appeared in a different
random order for four seconds. After each presentation,
participants decided whether to view the objects again or
make an estimate. Persistence of information acquisition
was measured by the number of times participants chose
to view the objects.
Individual differences. After completing the four
tasks, participants answered questions about cognitive
styles and personality dimensions. These included, in
an order chosen at random for each participant, the
Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (See Appendix),
need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984), the Short
Grit Scale (grit-s; Duckworth & Quinn, 2009), the
Maximization Scale (Nenkov, Morrin, Ward, Hulland,
& Schwartz, 2008), the Big 5 personality dimensions
(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), worry (Van Rij-
soort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999), and the Cogni-
tive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005).
2.2 Results
Participants viewed the objects an average of 5.70 (SD
= 3.99) times. They achieved 2.87 (SD = 0.96) correct
choices in four tasks, or a 71.86% success rate. Partici-
pants reported 69.04% confidence, on average, in the ac-
curacy of their choices in each task, which did not differ
significantly from their success rate, t(182) = −1.45, p =
.15. Participants were overconfident in their estimates of
the total number of objects presented. Their 80% con-
fidence intervals for the total number of objects included
the actual numbers in only 2.08 of the 4 trials (SD = 1.35),
achieving a success rate of 52.05%, significantly lower
than 80%, t(182) = 11.17, p < .001, d = 0.83.
2.2.1 The relationship between persistence of infor-
mation acquisition and performance
The number of times participants chose to view the ob-
jects was a highly skewed distribution, therefore we used
a log(10) transformation of information acquisition. This
variable was related to accuracy in estimates of the most
frequent item type, r = .415, p < .001 as well as in the
confidence intervals for the total number of objects on
the screen, r = .311, p < .001, although no relationship
with was found with the width (log transformed) of these
confidence intervals, r = −.071, p = .34. More informed
participants also felt more confident about the accuracy
of their choices, r = .246, p = .001, and the calibra-
tion of these confidence assessments (measured by the
squared difference between confidence and accuracy) im-
proved with the amount of information participants col-
lected prior to their estimates, r = −.172, p = .02.
2.2.2 The role of cognitive styles in performance
Table 1 summarizes the correlations among the scores on
the four cognitive style measures. Multiple stepwise re-
gression analyses revealed that AOT was the best predic-
tor among the four variables, and the only variable that
predicted both information acquisition and performance.
Participants who scored higher on the AOT scale made
more accurate estimates of the most frequent object type
and their confidence intervals for the total number of ob-
jects included the correct answer more often. Scores on
the AOT scale correlated positively with openness to ex-
perience, r = .229, p = .002, and need for cognition, r =
.355, p < .001, as well as with performance on the Cogni-
tive Reflection Test, r = .300, p < .001. However, none of
these other measures or any other measures in the study
was significantly related to performance on the experi-
mental tasks (see Table 2).
We conducted a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny,
1986) to test whether persistence of information acquisi-
tion mediated the relationship between AOT and perfor-
mance. As Figures 2 and 3 show, persistence of informa-
tion acquisition mediated the relationship between AOT
and performance, both in choosing the most frequent ob-
ject type (full mediation) and in accurate confidence in-
tervals for the total number of objects (partial mediation).
This suggests that high AOT individuals were more ac-
curate because of their willingness to view objects more
often before making their estimates. These results per-
sisted even after controlling for age and CRT score.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 8, No. 3, May 2013 Actively open-minded thinking 192
Table 1: Correlations among the four cognitive style dimensions and other individual attributes measured in Study 1.
AOT Need for cognition Grit Maximizing
AOT
Need for cognition .355***
Grit −.078 .276***
Maximizing −.096 .150* −.055
Agea .212** .022 .165* −.204**
Level of education .053 .125 .190* .127
Cognitive reflection .300*** .304*** −.024 .067
a Log(10) transformed. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Figure 2: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and choice accuracy in Study 1. Standardized coefficients
are presented. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
2.3 Discussion
We expected to find a positive relationship between in-
formation acquisition and AOT. But the construct, AOT,
is also related to the consideration and processing of ex-
isting information. Similarly, estimate performance de-
pends not only on the acquisition of relevant information,
but also on the effective processing of this information.
The mediation analyses suggest that in this study, AOT
worked by enhancing the former process: controlling
for persistence in information acquisition weakened the
relationship between AOT and performance. However,
the task employed in this study cannot distinguish be-
tween information acquisition and information process-
ing. Therefore, in Study 2, we constrained participants’
ability to collect more evidence and measured their per-
formance given a fixed amount of pre-estimate informa-
tion.
Figure 3: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and confidence interval hit-rate in Study 1. Standardized
coefficients are presented. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3 Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated that AOT influences performance
and is associated with a more persistent acquisition of in-
formation. In this study we sought to test whether there
are other ways by which high AOT individuals achieve
better performance, that are not related to information ac-
quisition. Note that the items used to measure AOT are at
least as related to the willingness to consider more diverse
information and give more weight to evidence that chal-
lenges one’s prior opinion, as they are to the propensity
to search for new evidence (see Appendix). So, while not
being excessively focused on one’s prior belief leads ac-
tively open-minded individuals to acquire more evidence
prior to forming an informed opinion, high and low AOT
individuals may also differ in how they process informa-
tion. To test this proposition, we kept the amount of infor-
mation constant. Under these conditions, any difference
in performance could be attributed only to more effec-
tive information processing. If, on the other hand, perfor-
mance will not correlate with AOT when information is
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Table 2: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct choices and accurate
confidence intervals in Study 1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
Information acquisition Correct choices
Accurate
confidence
intervals
Variablea Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Constant 0.238† 0.017 −0.669** 1.908*** 1.531** −0.113
(0.12) (0.16) (0.22) (0.40) (0.44) (0.56)
AOT 0.087** 0.091*** 0.066** 0.198* 0.193* 0.451***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Grit 0.006* 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Age b 0.579***
(0.13)
Level of 0.102*
education (0.05)
R2 .063** .085*** .174*** .032* .054** .081***
∆R2 .023* .088*** .022*
F 12.08 8.41 12.55 5.92 5.14 16.05
F for ∆R2 4.51 19.12 4.25
a Need for cognition and maximizing were not included in any significant model. Among the other variables,
only variables included in any significant model are presented. b log(10) transformed † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p
< .01, *** p < .001.
constant, results would suggest that the relationship be-
tween AOT and performance is driven primarily by the
search for information.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and procedure
Two-hundred twenty U.S. based participants (100 fe-
males, Mean age = 31.85) completed an online survey, in
exchange for $0.50 each. They completed the same tasks
and questionnaires used in Study 1, except that they did
not determine the amount of information they acquired
prior to making their estimates. Rather, they were ran-
domly assigned to three groups, varying in the amount of
information they received. One group viewed the objects
twice in each task before making an estimate. A second
group viewed the objects five times (the median number
of times participants viewed the objects in Study 1). The
third group viewed the objects eight times. We predicted
that more information would lead to better estimates, but
that, without the ability to control the amount of informa-
tion acquired, AOT would not predict performance.
3.2 Results and discussion
Participants correctly estimated the most frequent object
type 2.71 times (SD = 0.98), on average, out of four tasks,
achieving a 67.73% success rate. They displayed under-
confidence, by reporting 63.04% confidence, on average,
in the accuracy of their choices in each task, t(219) =
−2.73, p = .007, d = 0.19. Participants’ 80% confidence
intervals for the total number of objects included the ac-
tual number 1.58 times (SD = 1.06) on average, achieving
a success rate of 39.50%. This performance level was sig-
nificantly lower than the assigned 80% confidence level
to each confidence interval, t(219) = 22.67, p < .001, d =
1.53, implying overconfidence.
Table 3 shows the results of the different information
conditions. More information was related to more accu-
rate choices of the most frequent object type, r = .169,
p = .01 and higher average confidence in each choice, r
= .358, p < .001, although these relationships were not
observed in confidence interval estimates.2 The means
2Confidence interval hit-rate: r = −.058, p = .39; Estimated confi-
dence interval hit-rate: r = .033, p = .63.
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Table 3: Performance measures by amount of information participants received prior to estimating in Experiment 2.
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Condition/Measure Rate of correctchoices
Average confidence
in choice
Rate of accurate 80%
confidence intervals
Average confidence
interval width
2 times 61.0% (22.4) 55.7% (16.0) 40.6% (28.4) 15.5% (8.0)
5 times 71.7% (23.5) 63.7% (16.0) 41.3% (27.1) 14.5% (12.9)
8 times 71.0% (26.2) 70.1% (14.9) 36.8% (23.8) 14.9% (23.0)
provided in Table 2 suggest that viewing the objects 8
times did not improve participants’ performance relative
to those who viewed the objects 5 times, which may be
attributed to fatigue.
Did actively open-minded thinking predict estimate ac-
curacy when participants could not control the amount of
information? The answer is no. Multiple stepwise regres-
sion analyses reveal that, while the number of times the
objects were presented to participants predicted perfor-
mance on the choice tasks, B = 0.067, R2 = .029, F(1,218)
= 6.45, p = .01, but not confidence intervals, B = −0.025,
R2 = .003, F < 1, none of the cognitive styles or other
individual attributes we measured predicted performance
on either task, all Bs ≤ 0.112, all ts ≤ 1.69, all ps ≥
.1. Without the opportunity to conduct a more thorough
search for information, neither AOT nor any other vari-
able was related to performance.
These results are consistent with those of Study 1, in
which participants could collect as much information as
they wished prior to estimating. In Study 1, individu-
als with higher AOT gathered more information and per-
formed better. In Study 2, participants were given a fixed
amount of information and could not control the amount
they deemed sufficient for making an estimate, and, here,
AOT was not related to performance. This suggests that
the better performance of high AOT individuals in Study
1 was not due to the use of information already obtained,
but rather to their tendency to gather more information.
The failure of AOT to predict performance when infor-
mation acquisition is held constant seems, at first glance,
at odds with the definition of AOT as giving sufficient
weight to new information or information that is inconsis-
tent with prior beliefs. However, participants in Study 2
did not have a chance to form a prior belief before receiv-
ing the information; they knew nothing of the makeup
of object types before the tasks, and so had no refer-
ence point for considering new information. Neverthe-
less, performance in Study 2 did not imply differences in
the processing of information between individuals differ-
ing in AOT, suggesting that the performance differences
observed in Study 1 were due to differences in informa-
tion acquisition.
4 Study 3
In this study, we sought to replicate our previous findings
in a more naturalistic prediction setting. The added real-
ism addresses three concerns about Studies 1 and 2. First,
the tasks in these studies were unusual. We wanted to en-
sure that the effects of AOT and information acquisition
also held in more realistic contexts. Therefore, we cre-
ated a platform for predicting outcomes of sports games.
Second, in the first two studies, all pre-estimate infor-
mation items were equally valid and helpful for accuracy.
Real events, however, are less predictable. From warm,
sunny days in the middle of winter to the fall of long-
standing dictatorships, some events are not ones a wise
gambler would bet on, but they may nevertheless occur.
Studies 1 and 2 suggested that AOT predicted estimate
accuracy when judges could collect valid information. In
this study, we predicted that the relationship would hold
only when the prior information available was positively
correlated with the outcome. For example, when predict-
ing the outcome of a football game, one may use the in-
formation about the teams’ record leading up to the game,
and predict a win for the team with the better record (i.e.,
the favorite). If this team wins, then the prediction, which
was consistent with the available information, was also
accurate. However, if the team with the worse record (i.e.,
the underdog) ends up winning, then the prediction was
inaccurate, although it was still consistent with the infor-
mation available at the time. Therefore, we also mea-
sured predictions’ coherence, that is, the degree to which
predictions were consistent with prior information (Dun-
woody, 2009). Finally, in this study we introduced a mon-
etary incentive for prediction accuracy.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Two-hundred U.S. participants (87 females, Mage =
32.36) completed an online survey, for a flat $0.50 fee
plus a 1/50 chance to win a $10 prize. Additional $2
prizes were awarded to the ten participants with the most
accurate predictions.
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4.1.2 Procedure
This experiment consisted of two parts. While the sec-
ond part included the same battery of questionnaires used
in the previous two studies, the first part was a new pre-
diction task. Participants were asked to predict the out-
comes of ten games that took place during one week of a
National Football League season. To minimize unwanted
effects of expertise, we chose a mid-season week in a past
season, which was not revealed to participants.3
For each game, participants were told the names of
the home team and the road team and predicted the win-
ner. At the bottom of the screen, there were two but-
tons, one for “Information” and one for “Estimate”. Each
time they clicked the “Information” button, participants
received one of ten facts about one or both teams, in a
random order. These facts included a team’s record (over-
all, home/away games, and division/conference/inter-
conference games), a team’s recent performance (last
game, five games, or current streak), a team’s offensive
and defensive rankings, the outcome of the two teams’
last meeting, and injuries to significant players, if there
were any. After each fact was presented, participants
went back to the previous screen, where they could click
on “Information” again to receive another fact, or on “Es-
timate” to advance to the prediction of the winner.
After making all ten predictions, participants reported
their level of expertise in football (on a 1-9 scale, ranging
from “I know nothing” to “Expert”) and proceeded to the
battery of individual attribute questionnaires.
4.2 Results and discussion
Participants made an average of 5.65 correct predictions
out of 10 (SD = 1.36). They requested 2.11 facts (SD =
2.47), on average, before making each prediction. The
average level of confidence in the accuracy of their pre-
dictions was 70.59% (SD = 11.29), implying overconfi-
dence of 14.09%, t(199) = 11.62, p < .001, d = 0.82. Per-
formance correlated positively with expertise, r = .182, p
= .01, meaning that self-reported experts performed bet-
ter than novices.
Four of the ten games resulted in upsets, meaning that
the team with the inferior record leading up to the game
beat the team with the better record.4 For these four
games, information provided about teams’ past perfor-
mance was harmful, rather than helpful. This differ-
ence was indeed evident in the data: predictions for the
3Specifically, we used games from week 12 of the 2003 season. This
was the first point in the season (after week 2) at which all teams had
played an equal number of games. The choice of season was arbitrary.
At the end of the prediction task, participants were asked to guess the
season from which the games were taken; none guessed correctly.
4This rate of upsets is consistent with the historical average in the
NFL (Ben-Naim, Vazquez, & Redner, 2006).
Figure 4: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and accurate predictions in games won by the favorite in
Study 3. Standardized coefficients are presented. * p <
.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
non-upset games were correct more frequently (63% of
the time) than predictions for the upset games (46.75%,
which was almost significantly worse than chance, t(199)
= 1.73, p = .08). More importantly, pre-game informa-
tion acquisition was related to better prediction accuracy
of non-upset games, r = .311, p < .001, but to lower ac-
curacy in games that yielded unexpected outcomes, r =
−.504, p < .001. Therefore, we analyzed the two sets of
games (upsets and non-upsets) separately.
For non-upset games, we conducted multiple step-
wise regression analyses of information acquisition, per-
formance, confidence and overconfidence, including the
four cognitive styles and expertise. AOT was the only
variable that predicted information acquisition and per-
formance (see Table 4). All other variables were non-
significant. As Figure 4 shows, the relationship between
AOT and performance was partially mediated by persis-
tence of information search. Similar to Study 1, high
AOT participants acquired more information and made
more correct predictions than low AOT individuals.
Games with upsets, where more information was re-
lated to worse performance, showed a different pattern.
Multiple stepwise regression analyses reveal that, while
AOT was again the only variable to predict persistence of
information acquisition, it did not predict either perfor-
mance or confidence. Correctly estimating these surpris-
ing outcomes was rather related to expertise (see Table 5).
In fact, the relationship between AOT and performance
in these games was negative and almost significant, B =
−.127, t(199) = −1.80, p = .07. As Figure 5 shows, con-
trolling for persistence in information acquisition elimi-
nated this relationship.
To test the hypothesis that AOT predicted the extent to
which participants relied on the information they could
acquire before making an estimate, we measured the co-
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Table 4: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct estimates, confidence
and overconfidence in one’s estimates of games in which the better team won in Study 3. Unstandardized regression
coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
Information
acquisition
Correct
estimates
Confidence Overconfidence
Variablea Model 1 Model 2
Constant −0.980 2.623*** 66.441*** 32.915*** 39.83***
(0.97) (0.39) (2.04) (8.86) (9.36)
AOT 0.092** 0.034** −0.745** −0.652*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.26) (0.26)
Expertise 1.007*
(0.43)
Level of −2.414*
education (1.13)
R2 .052** .043** .027* .041** .063**
∆R2 0.022*
F 10.82 9.00 5.49 8.50 6.59
F for ∆R2 4.54
a The analyses included the four cognitive style variables, expertise, age, and level of education.
Only variables included in any significant model are presented. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Figure 5: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and accurate predictions in games won by the underdog
in Study 3. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
herence or consistency between the predicted outcome
and the outcome implied more likely by the pre-estimate
information. If higher AOT is linked to greater informa-
tion acquisition and greater reliance on the information
when making predictions, then higher AOT individuals
should display greater consistency with prior information
than lower AOT individuals. Our results support this pre-
diction. A multiple stepwise regression analysis reveals
that AOT was the only significant predictor of consis-
Figure 6: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and prediction coherence in Study 3. Standardized coef-
ficients are presented. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
tency, B = .217, R2 = .047, t(199) = 3.13, p = .002. As Fig-
ure 6 shows, this relationship was fully-mediated by the
number of pre-game facts acquired, suggesting that the
degree with which estimates followed pre-estimate infor-
mation depended on the amount of information acquired.
To summarize, this study replicated the findings of
Study 1 in a naturalistic prediction setting. Actively open-
minded thinking was related to information acquisition
and greater prediction coherence, or consistency between
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Table 5: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct estimates, confidence
and overconfidence in estimates of games that resulted in upsets in Study 3. Unstandardized regression coefficients
are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
Information
acquisition
Correct
estimates
Confidence
Variablea, b Model 1 Model 2
Constant −1.071 1.446*** 65.072*** 72.562***
(0.98) (0.15) (1.43) (3.83)
AOT 0.091**
(0.03)
Expertise 0.102** 1.338*** 1.343***
(0.03) (0.30) (0.30)
NFC −0.090*
(0.04)
R2 .050** .048** .090*** .110***
∆R2 .020*
F 10.50 10.02 19.69 12.23
F for ∆R2 4.43
a The analyses included the four cognitive style variables, expertise, age, and level of
education. Only those who were included in any significant model are presented. b The
analysis revealed no significant predictors of overconfidence. * p < .05. ** p < .01, *** p
< .001.
the prediction and the information acquired. When the
outcome was consistent with the acquired information,
AOT led to greater accuracy, but when the outcome was
an upset (i.e., inconsistent with the information), higher
AOT was associated with greater coherence and worse
performance. High AOT individuals collected more in-
formation and used it when making their predictions.
However, with invalid information, this strategy back-
fired.
5 General discussion
Estimations of present outcomes and predictions about
future outcomes can be difficult, if not impossible, tasks.
Prior research has produced evidence that people insuf-
ficiently search for relevant information before making
estimates. But as yet, there is no cure. We investigated
variables that predicted differences in the tendency to be
persistent in information search. Contenders included
actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cogni-
tion, grit, and maximizing. In three studies, we tested
these variables’ relationship with persistence in informa-
tion acquisition, and whether they predict estimate accu-
racy and calibration. We used two different methods of
estimating—item-confidence and confidence intervals—
which have been shown to differ in the degree of accuracy
and overconfidence they produce (Juslin, Wennerholm, &
Olsson, 1999).
The only variable related to information acquisition
and performance was AOT. This variable predicted ac-
curacy in both categorical and quantitative estimates.
Higher AOT was related to higher persistence in search
for information, higher accuracy of estimates and lower
overconfidence (though not via reduced confidence). Per-
sistence of information acquisition mediated the relation-
ship between AOT and performance. In Studies 1 and 3,
high AOT individuals acquired more information, which
in turn resulted in better performance when information
was helpful for producing accurate estimates. In Study 2,
when the amount of available information was kept con-
stant, AOT had no effect on performance.
Study 3 introduced the concept of prediction coher-
ence, or the degree to which predictions were consis-
tent with available information. For highly-probable out-
comes, more coherent predictions were also more accu-
rate. However, for an improbable outcome, in our case
an inferior team beating a superior team in an NFL game,
coherence was related to lower accuracy. AOT was as-
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sociated with greater coherence; higher AOT individuals
performed better when games were not upsets and worse
in games that resulted in upsets. When information was
misleading, high AOT individuals were more susceptible
to invalid information. In an uncertain world, event out-
comes do not always fully match prior information about
them. But as long as the information is at least somewhat
predictive, coherence should have a positive relationship
with accuracy, and AOT should be helpful in making ac-
curate estimates and predictions.
The mediating role of information acquisition in the re-
lationship between AOT and estimation performance can
potentially explain the effects of AOT found in prior re-
search. For example, AOT’s role in reducing belief bias
(Sa et al., 1999) may be related to high AOT individu-
als’ propensity to search for more available information,
whether in their environment or in memory, before an-
swering. AOT might also have an influence on other
problems in judgment and decision making. The positive
effect of information acquisition on confidence interval
hit-rate we found is consistent with the findings of Haran
et al. (2010), whose Subjective Probability Interval Esti-
mate (SPIES) method improved calibration of confidence
intervals by preventing judges from ignoring alternative
outcomes. It is possible that these results were achieved
by making all participants behave as high AOT individu-
als are naturally inclined to, and make a conscious effort
to obtain more relevant information during the estimation
process.
Actively open-minded thinkers’ inclination to search
and consider new information might also be observed in
choice settings. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that
large choice sets have a negative impact on consumer
satisfaction. AOT might play a role in this effect. One
possibility is that, by considering more information about
choice attributes, high AOT individuals might experience
a more severe choice overload than low AOT individuals.
Another possibility is that high AOT individuals are less
prone to choice overload, and that they demonstrate this
by not being reluctant to collect more information in their
evaluation of the choice set.
6 Limitations and future directions
The objective of this research was to test whether cog-
nitive styles predict persistence in information search
and estimation performance. AOT was found to pre-
dict both. Other aspects of the construct, not related to
information acquisition, should be investigated. These
include the willingness to spend time on problems and
to weigh information that contradicts one’s prior beliefs.
Although these aspects of AOT were not central to our
research question, they may demonstrate additional ways
by which AOT affects predictions and decisions, such as
enhancing Bayesian updating upon receiving information
that is inconsistent with an initial belief.
Future research should also explore whether AOT af-
fects retrieval of evidence from memory as it does acquir-
ing new information. Research sometimes treats avail-
able (though not yet acquired) information and known
information as the same. For example, accounts of some
forms of “confirmation bias” describe ignorance, or un-
derweighting, of information that contradicts a prior be-
lief, similarly when this information is already known to
the judge as when it is provided by an external source as
new evidence. However, not looking for new evidence
can be seen as an act of omission, whereas discounting
known information might be a more deliberate act. In-
vestigating the role of AOT in reducing bias in the pro-
cessing of these two types of information can shed light
on possible differences between these two processes.
Another influential factor (which we did not examine)
in forecasting is expertise. We elicited self-ratings of ex-
pertise in American football in Study 3, but the specific
items we used for forecasting, i.e., games from an un-
known past season, were unrelated to actual prior knowl-
edge. Future research should test interactions between
AOT and domain expertise in predicting estimation per-
formance.
6.1 Can AOT be taught?
Baron (1993, 1994) has advocated the teaching of adap-
tive cognitive thinking styles, including AOT. Baron et al.
(1986) conducted an 8-month course of decision making,
consisting of hypothetical examples, practice exercises
and feedback, aimed at instilling a consistent reduction
in students’ susceptibility to bias. Perkins, Bushey, and
Faraday (1986) conducted a similar course, in which they
taught students to search for arguments on both sides of
an issue and consider all relevant arguments. Both train-
ing programs improved thinking skills and processes.
Our studies demonstrate a positive relationship between
AOT and better forecasting. If these interventions can
cause changes in forecasting skills, they should be used
to train forecasters. Our search tasks could be used to
assess such improvement.
6.2 Concluding remarks
This work builds on previous research on individual dif-
ferences in prediction aptitude. Actively open-minded
thinking (AOT) predicted persistence in information ac-
quisition as well as accuracy and calibration of estimates.
High AOT individuals invested more effort in acquiring
information, which, in turn, improved the quality of their
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 8, No. 3, May 2013 Actively open-minded thinking 199
estimates. To the degree that this skill can be taught, it
should be used to improve forecasting.
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Appendix: The Actively Open-
Minded Thinking Scale
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with each
statement on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 = Completely Dis-
agree, 4 = Neutral, and 7 = Completely Agree. (LAST 4
should be reverse coded).
1. Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing
argument is a sign of good character.
2. People should take into consideration evidence that
goes against their beliefs.
3. People should revise their beliefs in response to new
information or evidence.
4. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
5. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.
6. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even
when evidence is brought to bear against them.
7. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with
one’s established beliefs.
